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METHODOLOGY
Analysis Plan,

When a DTA worker

assesses whether a family's

(T)AFDC

case will be closed, s/he

decides which one of 67 different codes best describes the reason cash benefits for the household
will

be stopped.

that logically

To

carry out the analyses,

grouped together: Cluster

Eligible Persons

I,

we

sorted

all

of the 67 codes into clusters of codes

Increased Income; Cluster H, Sanctions; Cluster

Moved; Cluster IV, Fraud; Cluster V,

Client Request; Cluster VI,

III,

No Longer

Eligible; Cluster VII,

Other or Multiple Meanings.^ The Appendix displays a description of the

case closing codes

each cluster that provided a basis for our analyses.

(Statistical

in

Package for the Social Sciences) to calculate the trends

in the

We used SPSS
number and percentages

of case closings from October, 1995 to August, 1997 for each of the clusters mentioned above,

and from October, 1993 to August, 1997 for the category of Earned Income only
Cluster

I,

Increased Income).

(a sub-set of

We used four time periods for our analysis of earned income case

closings, reflecting the progression of events surrounding the passage and full implementation of

Massachusetts' welfare reform measures. These time periods are: October 1993 to September

1994, former

AFDC phase;

October 1994 to September 1995,

passage phase; October 1995 to September 1996,
to

initial

legislative deliberation

and

implementation phase; and October 1996

August 1997, the most recent implementation phase.

Limitations.

•

Changes in some codes between 1993 and 1995
post-reform comparisons.

limit

New codes were added

in

our

this policy brief are limited to increased

codes remained the same throughout the

•

entire time period

We initially had an eighth category,

"Detennined to be ineligible

comprised of Codes 56 and 70. These codes are used for instances
benefits,

analysis.

pre-

and

Pre- and post-reform

income due

Some of the case closing codes have multiple meanings.

^

make

1995 to accommodate the

sanctions that were part of the state's welfare reform plan.

comparisons for

ability to

to earnings:

These

under investigation.

For example. Code 66 has the

at the time of applicaticHi,"

which was

which families have ^plied for cash
but did not receive them. We agreed with the DTA recommendation to eliminate this category ftam the
We have included only those case closings in which households had actually received cash benefits.
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following two meanings: (1) Grantee closed due to failure to cooperate with the Child

Enforcement Unit and

30 days of its being

(2)

filed.

Case denied, your Medical Report was not completed within

the

(For additional examples, please see the Appendix.) All of the

cases closed for multiple meanings and other miscellaneous reasons were grouped into one
category.

•

Several case closing codes

may be relevant for any one closure. However, DTA

workers are limited to choosing one reason for closing a family's case. For example, a
family

may experience an

Limited to using only one code, a welfare worker

benefits.

code 76

(client

may likely close

case using

this

requested that cash benefits be stopped), rather than code 61 (closing due

to earned income). While
officially closing

•

increase in income, and therefore request a termination of their

more than one code may be

relevant, the

code chosen

for

a family's case has to be legally defensible.

Finally, analysis of the case closing data does not provide a detailed picture of how

families are actually doing as a result of the termination of their

(T)AFDC

the most important indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of welfare reform.

benefits
It

simply

provides a picture of trends in the reasons that Massachusetts households ojficially lost

(T)AFDC

cash benefits.
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RESULTS
Question

1.

Have more families

left

the welfare rolls since the implementation of welfare

reform as compared with the pre-reform period?

For the

who

entire period under investigation, (October 1993-

received

AFDC left the welfare rolls each month.

September 1995), 4.6% of AFDC

5.1%

families receiving benefits,

in the

Figure

1.

(T)

1995

-

month, as compared with

August 1997). This difference

Massachusetts welfare caseload

is

is

significant.

attributable to fewer

lower percentages of new case openings, and higher percentages of

families leaving the rolls (See Figure

percentages of families

For the pre-reform period (October 1993

families left the welfare rolls each

for the post-reform period (October

This indicates that the steady drop

and August 1997), 4.9% of families

who

left

1).

However, we found no

significant difference in the

the welfare rolls due to earned income pre and post reform.

AFDC Cases

Average Total Open

Oct

'93 to

Sep

'94

Oct

'94 to

Sep

'95

Oct

'95 to

Sep

Oct

'96

'96 to

A ug

'97

Time Frame
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Question

2.

During the period from November 1995 through August 1997, for what reasons

TAFDC cases officially closed?

have families'

Between November 1995 and August 1997, a

total

of 95,654

TAFDC cases were officially closed

for the foUowing reasons (in descending order) (See Figure 2)

~

40%

(n= 36,775) of cases were closed due to sanctions
[including non-compliance with procedural requirements (33

%,

(n

=

31,215); and

non-compliance with behavioral requirements (6 %, n = 5,560)];

~ 24

%

(n

= 23,056) were closed

for increased

[including earned income (19

%, n =

income

18,596)];

% (n = 14,366) were closed as a result of client request;
% (n = 10,986) were closed with codes having other or multiple meanings;
8 % (n = 8,013) were closed due to eligible persons moved;
2 % (n = 2,030) were determined to be no longer eligible;
0.5 % (n = 428) were closed due to fraud.

~ 15
~
~
~

~

1 1

Figure

2:

DTA Case Closings

(October 1995
Total

number

No

of

to

Post Reform

August 1997)

cases closed (n=95,654)

longer eligible

Increased income
(n>:23.056)

24%
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Question
initial

3.

How do reasons for TAFDC case closings in Massachusetts compare between the

implementation (October 1995 to September 1996)

and most recent implementation

(October 1996 to August 1997) of welfare reform ?

With few exceptions, the differences

in reasons for

'

case closings between these two time periods

(October 1995 to September 1996) and (October 1996 to August 1997) are not significantly

The two

different (See Figure 3).

categories showing significant change were: non-compliance

with procedural requirements (an increase from
decrease from

15%

to

30%

to

36%), and multiple meanings/other

(a

8%).

Figure

3:

DTA Case Closings

(October 1995 to August 1997)

Post WeHar«-Reform Anatysis

3&3%

Oct

"95 to

Sep

"96

nzS0,7S7

Oct

'96 to

Aug

"97

n=44.a97

Percentage of
cases closed

5.6%
,
1-7%

1

i M:

Hon oe m pi

preoadural

1

kiorMiCd
Inoen*

1

CNmrt r*^uMt

1

1

1

BlgM*p*r«en«
MuWpt*
movad
MMNnga/Olttar

m

Wct>-ooinpll

bahavtoral

o«:

2.5%
0.49%
0.41%

1

Noleng*r

Fraud

algM*

Category of closing

MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST

1997

May

IS,

1998

Question

4.

How do reasons for (T)AFDC case closings due to earned income in Massachusetts

compare over four time periods: the former AFDC phase; the
phase; the

initial

and passage

implementation phase; and the most recent implementation phase?

The earned income category is
effort is to

legislative deliberation

promote

families'

especially important:

economic

The primary goal of the

self-sufficiency,

assistance for meeting their basic needs.

Our

and to decrease

20%

and

19%

their reliance

analysis indicates that in the first

of cases were closed due to increased earned income, while
accounted for only

State's welfare

in the third

reform

on public

two time

periods,

22%

and fourth time periods, they

of case closings (respectively) (See Figure

4).

This decrease

is

not

DTA suggests that this decrease may be the result of the higher income disregard

significantly lower,

allowed within the current welfare regulations that enables recipients to continue to receive cash
benefits while earning

of cash

income

at levels that, in

benefits. This fact alone

could explain

pre-reform days, would have precipitated a termination

why the percentages of cases closed due

to earned

income decreased during the post-reform period.

Figure 4: Percentage of

DTA Cases

Closed due to Earned Income
100%

M

80%

0)
(0
(0

O
60%

O

Q)

O)

o

C

40%

u
20%

0%
Oct '93 to Sep '94 Oct '94 to Sep '95 Oct '95 to Sep '96
(n=12,367)

(n=13,090)

(n=9,945)

Oct '96 to
'97

Aug

(n=8.651)

Time Frame
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DISCUSSION

Decreasing welfare caseloads receives prominence
welfare reform experiment
families

make

is

the transition from welfare to work, while earning

families leave the welfare rolls to

On the national front,

go

media as an indication that the

nation's

A more important indicator of success is the extent to which

working.

parent their children well While welfare reform

1997).

in the

was

initially

enough

to

meet

24%

the welfare caseload has dropped by

media portrayal of "get tough" welfare reform

needs and

passed with the expectation of having more

to work, our findings indicate that this goal

Opponents of welfare reform explain the

their basic

is

yet to be realized.

since January of 1993 (Tatara,

drastic decline in caseloads

by speculating

policies has played a role in discouraging

that the

low-income

parents from applying for benefits, and has exacerbated the long-standing stigma associated with welfare
receq)t in the United States. Receiving welfare has

become even more

socially unacceptable

(Abramovitz, 1996; Blank, 1997).
In Massachusetts, the total welfare caseload has steadily declined over the past five years,

mirroring a

downward

unemployment

trend in the

rate for this

same period (See Figure 5)^

5

Figure

Massachusetts Monthly Welfare Caseloads and Unemployment Rates
July 1988-October1997
120.000

10.0%

110,000
c
>

100.000

90.000

--

80.000

--

£

I3
Z

70.000

60.000

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

—Caseload

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

'I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

2.0%

— Unemployment Rate

Source: DTA Family Caseload data. UDemployment data from Massachusetts Division of Employmerrt and Training and
are seasonally adjusted.

^

Prepared by Randy Albelda, economist at the University of Massachusetts Boston.
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A DTA study, conducted for the months of December
than half of the families

While

we questioned

who

the

1996 and January 1997, found that more

months were working (DTA, 1997).

lost welfare benefits in those

methodology

DTA used to reach this finding, we had expected that the

percentages of cases closed due to earned income would have increased during the post-reform
period, given the State's current

booming economy.

Instead,

we found

that only about

cases were closed for this reason during both the pre-reform and post-reform periods.

one

in five

Our

findings are similar to those reported in a recent General Accounting Office study of

Massachusetts' and other states' welfare reform measures

only

23%

(GOA,

The

1997).

GAO reported that

of Massachusetts families leaving welfare had earned income once cash benefits

stopped.

The

discrepancies in

DTA and our study findings (50%

methodological differences in sampling strategy and analysis.

vs.

19%)

We utilized only one data source

for analyzing cases closings for the period under investigation, however,

months of DTA

data.

are due to

we had

access to 47

DTA utilized more data sources than were available for this study (Le.,

case closing codes, client records, case worker and client interviews). However, the analysis

covered only a two month period, and relied

in part

upon case worker

recollections, a

questionable research strategy for the issues under consideration. Additionally, the cases

reviewed included only those families

who remained

off of welfare for a six

excluded the 14-17% of cases that get re-opened each month.

month

DTA

period, and

In contrast, our analysis included

the entire universe of cases that were closed each month.

The most

striking finding

of our study

is

that

more

recipients lose their benefits as a result

of sanctions than for any other reason. In the post-reform period,
either because of a procedural or behavioral sanction.

complete a monthly income verification report to

40%

Sanctions include anything fi"om failure to

failure to participate in

Similar findings have been cited nationwide. For example, in Maryland,

due

to "starting work," while

31%

of the cases were closed

work

12% of cases were

(GAO,

1997).

67%

closed

of their cases were closed due to sanctions (Maryland Family

Investment Administration, 1997). Mississippi fared even worse with only

because of earnings, and

requirements.

of families losing benefits for

failure to

8%

of cases closing

comply with program

rules

A recently publicized New York study reported that in the first few months after

MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST

1997

May

15,

1998

10
families in

New York City lost welfare benefits,

However,

it

only

should be noted that families earning as

29%

found full-time or part-time jobs.
as

little

$100 over a

three

month period were

considered employed (Hernandez, 1998). Finally, researchers in Wisconsin investigated income
trends

among 7,502

single parents for

one year

after leaving the

Milwaukee welfare

found that only 10% of these parents were able to sustain income above the poverty
that

55%

returned to

AFDC within that year

employment

at

level,

and

(Pawasarat, 1997).

Findings from these studies strongly suggest that very low-income families
able to sustain

and

rolls,

wages high enough

to

meet

their basic needs,

may

not be

without periodic

access to publicly-fimded income support. In Massachusetts, a family of three would need an

income of $27,500 a year
than

30%

of their income on rent (Stone, 1997).

would need

to be

working

full

To

reach

market rent

this

income

rates,

level,

spending no more

a single mother

time at a job that paid $14.30 per hour, almost three times the

A family of three, subject to time limits on welfare receipt, becomes ineligible

minimum wage.
for

to afford housing at the lowest fair

TAFDC benefits when the parent earns more than $5.70 per hour from ftill-time work,

yielding a yearly

income of only $1 1,856, not enough to pay for housing and for other basic

necessities of life.

The

only category of case closings that increased during the most recent welfare reform

implementation phase was failure to comply with procedural requirements (from
case closings). This increase

44

in

1995 to 40

may

at the present time, is creating

more access barriers

for families.

That

have greater distances to travel for appointments

DTA offices, and more challenging public transportation obstacles to overcome.
families are

36%

to

of

be an indication that the consolidation of welfare offices, from

families in several parts of the State

more

30%

working while receiving cash

benefits, or carrying out their

is,

at the local

In addition,

community

if

service

requirement, then taking time to complete the monthly paperwork, transport their children to child
care or school, and keep appointments with their local

DTA workers may be a tremendously

difficult feat.

While one goal of welfare reform has been reached

(Le.,

analysis suggests that the version of welfare reform adopted

MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST
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majority of welfare recipients to

That

is,

limits are

looming on the horizon.

non-exempt families who have received welfare for a consecutive 24 month period

begin to lose cash benefits in

become

move out of poverty. Time

December 1998.

financially secure, time limits

may

reforms are not enabling families to

If welfare

be the

will

final precipitating

force that plunges the most

vulnerable and poor families further into poverty, exacerbating a full range of social and

community-wide

tragedies. All stakeholders in the welfare reform debate

want

of potential negative outcomes: additional physical and emotional harms on

to avoid a range

women

and children

forced to stay with violent family members; involuntary separations for other families; increased
loss of housing

and subsequent increases

outcomes for children

in these families;

services, correctional systems,

homelessness; negative developmental and health

in

and use of homeless assistance, programs, protective

emergency medical

services,

and food pantries as the only fallback

options for families.
In a very real way, welfare reform in Massachusetts

experiment.

Time

limits

is

a high stakes, untested social policy

have never before been a part of the State's or country's social welfare

system. Three minimal requirements should be integral to the implementation process, and agreed

upon by proponents and opponents of the

State's

approach to welfare reform.

status of every family leaving the welfare rolls should be

First, the

known, and tracked over

economic

time.

Case

closing data are one important source of information for tracking the reasons families are losing

welfare benefits. Additional sources of information will need to be utilized to examine
families are doing economically over time.

make ends meet, should continue

Second, families

who

a time

limit.

and training with support from the

income support should be available to those

families

who

MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST

these

are working, but are not able to

to receive cash benefits, without

families should be able to obtain education

how

In addition,

State. Finally,

are unable to work.

1997
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15,
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Department of Transitional Assistance Commentary on the

McCormack

Institute of Public Affairs Policy Brief:

Massachusetts

(T)AFDC Case

October 1993

We appreciate the opportunity to
Brief:

Massachusetts

-

Closings

August 1997

provide this commentary on the

(T)AFDC Case

Closings.

McCormack

Institute's Policy

The Department of Transitional Assistance

(DTA) has been and continues to be in the forefront of investigating cases that leave cash
assistance. Our experience to date is that such a complex issue as the workforce participation of
former

TAFDC

recipients carmot be adequately

answered by using only administrative records,

especially records designed for a quite different purpose.

Codes Are Not An Adequate Data Source For Measuring The Workforce

A. Closing

Participation

Of Former TAFDC

Families.

The main purpose of DTA closing codes

why we

is

to provide proper notification to the recipient about

are closing their case so that they can

remedy the

situation that caused the closing or can

appeal the reason. Consequently, as noted in the Policy Brief, "while
relevant, the

code chosen

For example, if a worker presents information that the recipient

evidence from the family, which

though

we have evidence

is

these

review,

not forthcoming,

to that effect.

requested verification. Similarly,
eligibility

more than one code may be

for officially closing a family's case has to be legally defensible."

if

Rather,

is

we must

close

requests

close the case for earnings, even
it

for failing to provide a

a recipient family chooses not to appear for a scheduled

DTA must close the case

two reasons as "sanctions'"

we cannot

may be working and

for failing to redetermine eligibility.

too broad a definition of sanctions. In

fact,

To

consider

the family

is

given the opportunity immediately to remedy the problem.

We

suspect

- and our

studies confirm

-

that a substantial

number of procedural closings

are

really earnings or eligibility related.

Earnings Related Case Closings Have Declined During Good Economic
Times, Regardless Of The Welfare Policy.

B. Historically,

The same trend reported in the Policy Brief - slight, non-significant declines in the earnings
related code closings - has been seen before, ironically during the "Massachusetts Miracle". As
the table below shows, earnings related case closings were at their lowest during the October
1984 to September 1986 period, a lime when the AFDC caseload was at (then) historic lows,
when the work program was voluntary, when there were no time limits, and when the economy
was expanding rapidly over several years.

Page

1

Everyone

at the

time agreed that the decline in the

the direct result of increased

AFDC

employment opportunities

caseload during the early 1980's was

DTA's

Yet then, as now,

for recipients.

closing codes did not reflect such a pattern, primarily because our closing codes are intended to

we

provide the reason

The data

in

Table

1

are acting to close the case and not to track

force participation of former welfare recipients regardless

decline

is

why

cases leave assistance.

highlight the inappropriateness of using closing codes to measure the

through voluntary work

participation or through

of the extent

to

work

which the caseload

program requirements. Every time the

caseload increased, the earnings related closing code rate also increased. Likewise, three of four

may

times the caseload decreased the rate also decreased. While this
,

occurred

in similar

be counterintuitive,

it

has

economic, but quite different programmatic, times.

Table

Trends

in

1:

Cases Closed for Earnings

October 1982 to September 1987

Compared

to

October 1993 to September 1997

Time Period

Average Caseload

Eamings-Related(%)

October 1983 to September 1984

85,181

20.2

October 1984 to September 1985

84,582

16.7

October 1985 to September 1986

85,801

17.0

October 1986 to September 1987

86,432

18.7

104,725

21.76

957723

22.12

October 1995 to September 1996

83,920

19.50

October 1996 to September 1997

74,270

19.19

October 1993 to September 1994
'

October 1994 to September 1995

C.

DTA

Is

'

Currently Conducting Studies To Better Understand The Effect

Of Welfare

Reform On Families.

DTA

concerned about the serious limitations of administrative records and because
committed to assessing, accurately and reliably, the effects of welfare reform on
Massachusetts" low income families, we are regularly conducting follow up studies of case

Because

wc

is

are strongly

closings.

In the past

eighteen months

we have conducted

three studies of closed cases, are in the

process of conducting a longitudinal study, and are working

w ith

the Welfare

Forum on

yet

another.

Wc

have conducted three studies of cases

xcrifv. failing to

complete an

that closed for

ambiguous reasons, including

eligibility redelerniinalion. clients" request,

undersiand what circumstances exist

when

failing to

and others. To better

cases closed and remained closed,

we

investigated

"ambiguous" closings for a two month period at three different times. Each time
sample was more than 1,700 cases that closed and remained closed 30 - 60 days later.
half of the

the

Our findings consistently

indicate that half of the closed cases had earned income, an additional

10% of the closed cases had unearned income (primarily child support) and approximately 1%
moved out of state. To demonstrate the inappropriateness of using closing codes exclusively, we
1

need only look

reasons cases closed for failing to provide a requested verification;

at the actual

6%) had

new job

"

3

°

14 cases (7%) had increased earnings

°
°
**

°
°

°

1

cases

5 cases

23 cases

(

1

a

(8%) moved out of state
( 1

2%) had an

absent parent return

4 cases (2%) received support from family or friend
1 9 cases ( 1 0%) received unearned income

26 cases (14%) had no eligible children
2 cases (1%) had excess assets
9 cases (5%) were categorically ineligible

**

°

1

3

1

cases

(

1

6%) were

process of reapplying

in the

°

4 cases (2%) refused to answer

"

2 cases

°

1

%) had

another reason, and

cases (5%) were not able to be contacted.

1

Virtually

(

none of these constitute a sanction, although each was counted as such

in the Policy

Brief

The Department of Transitional Assistance
that closed

sample

is

currently conducting a longitudinal study of cases

during the January through June 1997 period.

at three, six,

nine and twelve

month

intervals

We are contacting the

former recipient

and conducting an in-depth interview

regarding their income, family composition, well being, use of other services, transportation and
other aspects of their lives.

In

summary,

We expect the results will

be available in early 1999.

DTA remains committed to and actively involved

in tracking closed cases to better

understand the often complex effects of welfare reform.

We also would like to
°
A GAO report

identify several oversights in the Policy Brief

cited as indicating that

is

23% of Massachusetts

had earned income when cash benefits stopped. The same

"Because not

all

families leaving welfare

GAO report notes that

households had to report such income, these percentages are likely to be

understated."

(GAO/HEHS

significantly,

GAO only examined a very select group of closed cases, specifically only

97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination, page 37) Even more

cases terminated and in closed status for failure to meet the work, teen school or teen
living requirements.

percentage of the
°

In their report, the closed teens

total

examined by

The Policy Brief makes only scant note of a major
recipients remain eligible for

generous disregards -

On

that

were a considerably higher

GAO than they are in the active caseload.

TAFDC

at

policy change - whereby

nonexempl

higher earned income levels because of more

would contribute

to a reduction in earnings related closings.

page seven of the Policy Brief, the authors acknowledge "This

Page

3

fact

alone [the increase

in the

earned income disregard] could explain

why

the cases closed due to earned income

decreased during the post-reform period."
°

In

acknowledging the discrepancy between DTA's and the

Institute's findings

on

earnings related closings, the Policy Brief authors note that they used only a single source
but for a

much

longer time period

- 47 months - while

shorter period. If the data are unreliable

periods used
°

The

Institute's

DTA's
distorts
°

The

is

studies,

DTA used several

and incomplete

to

sources for a

begin with, the number of

inconsequential.

methodology included families that closed and subsequently reopened. In
more than 20% of closings reopen within 30 - 60 days. Obviously, this

any subsequent calculations and projections to cases that remain closed.

Institute's

recipients"

concluding remarks on the "inadequate income levels of former welfare

seems out of place considering

that

no data are provided on the subject, and

no such conclusions can be garnered from closing codes.

In

summary, Massachusetts remains committed

to ensuring that

TAFDC

recipients are as

life after- cash assistance ends, and to studying how they are faring
whenever that occurs. We believe that this is a complex problem, and that a superficial analysis
of such a complex problem only distorts the true picture of what is happening under welfare

prepared as possible for

reform.
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Farrell & Mary Doyle
Homes for Families

Brenda

We are pleased to be able to provide commentary on the important work that the
McCormick

Institute has

done regarding the implications of Welfare Reform on

Homes for Families welcomes the opportunity to have accurate
information documenting why families are moving off welfare. So often we read stories in
the paper that do not reflect the stories we hear from the families we witness in our work.
The reasons why families are leaving the welfare rolls, as well as information on where
Massachusetts

families.

they go or what happens next,

is

needed both to evaluate the efficiency of existing

programs and to work for improvement.

The

brief,

while providing

some answers,

is

a catalyst for

many more

questions.

We will

focus on four of them:

how are the goals being

•

what

•

why

•

are there any hidden costs associated with the reduction in rolls?

•

why

isn

v^'ith

welfare reform?

is

the goal of welfare reform, and

are so

t

many more

the

families losing benefits

evaluated?

due to sanctions?

number of families leaving welfare due

to earned

income increasing

of the policy brief it is stated that "Proponents of the reform {welfare
hoped that the shift in social policy would enable more families to end their
dependence on public assistance and become financially secure." Nothing in the report
In the first paragraph

I

eform)

findings suggests that financial security for families in Massachusetts

reform. Instead,

it

appears there

is

one goal, decreasing case

loads.

is

a goal of welfare

The focus on

decreasing case loads and state reports indicating that declining numbers
policy

is

is

proof that

working, shows a total disregard for poor families and their children

in

Massachusetts. With the objective being decreasing case numbers, not financial security

and stable

lives for recipients,

it

is

no wonder

that families are victims

of procedural and

behavioral sanctions.

Homes

for Families

TAFDC
Homes

is

not surprised by the findings regarding the reasons that families'

cases were officially closed.

Many homeless

for Families have reported cases being closed

families

and other members of

due to unnecessarily

cruel sanctions.

TAFDC

procedural requirements are often times consuming, confusing and

difficult

to

comply with. In addition, homeless families are under a great deal of stress, the majority
of families have become homeless due to crisis in their lives, including domestic violence
and divorce. Parents, most often women, are dealing with the effects of the crisis, all the
while trying desperately to cope and help their children through the often horrific

experience of homelessness.

For families living on the edge, struggles are complicated by monthly reporting, visits to
appointments at scattered welfare offices, (often without transportation) and seemingly
endless documentation requirements that would be difficult for any TAFDC recipient to
fulfill. It is especially overwhelming for those facing the compounded issues of
homelessness and hopelessness. It is understandable why numerous families are being
sanctioned for non-compliance with the

The

significant

change

in

many

rules

and regulations.

case closings due to non-compliance with procedural

requirements raises a series of questions that need to be answered as
or failure of Massachusetts welfare reform legislation.

First,

why

are

we

assess the success

more

families being

sanctioned? Is compliance with procedural requirements becoming more and more
difficult?

What happens

to the families that have been

removed

compliance with procedural requirements? Are the 14
families simply reapplying
their cases?

How quickly

-

TAFDC

cases

and complying with the procedural requirements that closed

does

this

happen and what happens to the children and parents

while they deal with the bureaucratic nightmare of applying for

While the

due to non-

fi^om the rolls

17% of reopened monthly

we

TAFDC?

of other
social service programs Is the number of families applying for emergency assistance (EA)
increasing? It would seem that families who are losing their only source of income are at
greatest risk of becoming homeless. The Department of Transitional assistance does not
roll

shrink

question whether there are any increases in

keep track of the number of families that apply for

rolls

EA shelter and are denied,

they only

who receive it. Given the high cost of sheltering a family as compared to the
low cost of providing a TAFDC grant for the same family one would have to

count those
relatively

wonder why

this is

The

who

families

not being tracked?

struggle to

overcome poverty and the shame associated with welfare are

constantly barraged by hostility from the media, society and the Department of
Transitional Assistance.

The

statistics

provided by the brief showing a

closings due to fraud proves that families

on

TAFDC

less

TAFDC

are barely

ends meet. This authenticates our belief that families on welfare are using

what they were

originally designed for, as a

1%

case

are not those portrayed in the press,

frauds ripping off the system, living a live of ease. Families on

for

than

making

TAFDC

grants

temporary means of support for families

in

crisis.

The

disturbing finding that there has been

to earned

little

change

in the

number of case

closings due

income in the wake of welfare reform highlights the need to refocus the supports
on TAFDC rather than ending benefits. There is often a mismatch between

to families

available jobs that

public assistance.

pay a livable wage and the skill level of those making the transition off
With no education or training to close the gap, recipients are locked in

entry level jobs with

no

public assistance. It's time to think about
to

work and back

of long-term cycling between work and
to help families transition, not from welfare

future, with a potential

again, but

how

from welfare to

financial security.

With the constant struggle to survive, it is difficuh for a family to comply with the
seemingly endless requirements and rules simply to remain poor. The McCormick Institute
policy brief asks a series of important questions relevant to the development of long term
solutions to poverty, homelessness and family self-sufficiency in our Commonwealth. The
policy brief provides us with needed data which will enable us to continue to advocate for
the supports that families have repeatedly informed us they need. These supports are

needed to obtain solutions, not the bureaucratic, systematic elimination of benefits to
children and parents. Education, job training, safe affordable child care, affordable
housing, transportation, and the access to jobs that pay a living
the often asked question

"How

wage

are the answers to

does a family on welfare make the transition from welfare

to work''".

We need to continue to ask more questions and search for the answers. How can the
children in Massachusetts reap the benefits of a sound economy? How can we improve
TAFDC so families are moving to jobs paying living wages, not being sanctioned for noncompliance with a myriad of regulations? How can we make conclusions regarding the
success of welfare reform

when we

don't

know where

return to welfare, or other state programs?

Our

public policy should focus on

families

Economic independence

the long term stability of families

focus of welfare reform needs to change from the numbers
focusing on living

wage jobs, and

go nextis

financial security,

a goal for

all

of us.

and communities. The

game and poor

public policy to

financial security for families in Massachusetts.
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COMMENTARY ON A POLICY BRIEF: MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS
Randy Albelda
for the Boston Area Academics ' Working

The McCormack

paper on case closings

Institute's

is

Group on Poverty

welcome addition

a

to discussion

on

welfare reform in Massachusetts. Their detailed look at the closing codes for families leaving
welfare sheds important light on a dimly

way

important insights into the

an implementation system that

lit

subject.

welfare reform
is far

is

The policy

proceeding

brief highlights three very

Massachusetts.

in

First,

it

points to

too reliant on closing cases. as punishment for not meeting

procedural and behavioral requirements. Second, the data point to a low percentage of people
leaving welfare for earnings. Third, the

McCormack

study raises larger questions

Institute's

about the type of information needed to assess the efficacy of welfare reform as well as raise

way

serious questions about the

the

Department of Transitional Assistance collects and interprets

We discuss these three

information about the impacts of Massachusetts' welfare reform.

issues

separately below.

WELFARE B Y SANCTION
The finding

that

two out of every

five case closings is

compliance gives us tremendous pause. Even

if

due

to

behavior or procedural non-

the cases closed due to missing a reporting

deadline or a meeting with a caseworker are reinstated soon after, there
concern. Families

whose cases

primary source of income

when

good reason

for

are closed, even if due to procedural reasons, are without their
their case is closed.

TAFDC

indicates that people turn to

is still

Virtually

all

research on welfare use

because they are poor, almost always in

Many

have stable income from families or the labor market.

families receive

crisis,

and do not

TAFDC

because

employment stemming from domestic violence and mental and physical
The DTA has not released data on the characteristics of those with cases closed, so

adults face barriers to
disabilities.

there
is

no way

is

good reason

to

know

if

non-compliance

to believe that recipients

is

a willful act of negligence or irresponsibility. There

do not make meetings with caseworkers or

fill

out the

proper forms for other reasons: because of their inability to cope with many, complicated, and

seemingly irrational rules; because appointments were rescheduled

come; or due

was too

to the closing

of some

that in

its

So much so, that
(GAO), in their report
at

out another form

L 1996,

DTA

is

relying heavily

States Early Experiences with Benefit Termination.

The

GAO

was one of the three states with the highest degree of benefits
based on a review of the ,969 case closings due to sanctions as of

Massachusetts because

termination. In their report,

Dec. 3

trip to fill

on the use of
the department drew the attention from the General Accounting

implementation of welfare reform the

sanctions.

looked

making another

a time clients could not

difficult.

We know
Office

DTA offices,

at

it

1

they found:

of the families whose cases were originally closed, 32.

1

percent were reopened, either

because families were indeed eligible and had been incorrectly sanctioned, or because
they corrected the problem which had led to case closure (p. 34);

of those families staying off the

rolls,

74.4 percent did not continue to receive food

stamps and 41.5 percent did not continued to receive Medicaid, even though
appear that they should have been entitled to both

it

would

(p. 43);

of the families located after being cut off, 23 percent were earning wages (p. 38). Of
those who were earning wages, the average monthly wage was $540.00, still well below
the poverty level.

They found

that families are leaving without receiving the supports

entitled to them, such as health C2ire

Members of our group

and child care subsidies.

are very active in research, educational and organizational efforts

conceming welfare reform

in Massachusetts, especially in the

Boston area.

We often come

into

contact with recipients, advocates, researchers in the field, and caseworkers. Overwhelmingly,

we hear is that the DTA is conducting welfare reform by sanction and
We take a closer look at this issue in a report fi-om the Academics' Working Group

the anecdotal evidence
intimidation.

on Poverty called Bad Timing: An Analysis of Massachusetts' Welfare Time Limits. Vicky
Stories abound, at community
Steinitz' recently released report documents human rights abuses.
meetings and public "speak outs," about increases in fi-equency of redetermination hearings,
forced and unexpected lectures by local office administrators regarding the necessity to get a job,

any job, and simple misinformation and conftision in the offices are common.

have reports that harassment has increased leading to
that they are not

as suggested

women leaving the

Anecdotally,

system

in

such

distress,

even being told about the options for continuing child and health care that

by the

who admit to being

we

exist,

GAO study. We hear stories of increases in misinformation from workers,
ill

informed and overwhelmed by new

rules.

We hear too that the new rules

leave caseworkers less and less able to respond sensitively to individual client situations.

If welfare

reform has created in increase

in the

intimidated off welfare, even for a month, that

should not be. This outcome
goals of welfare reform.
especially

what

is

The

happening

is

numbers of families being sanctioned or
means families are without income when they

bad for these families,

their

community, and violates the stated

data in this report signals that welfare reform implementation,
to families leaving

because of sanctions, deserves a closer look.

WHO'S WORKING?

A second

important finding in this report

to earnings.

There are two ways

is

the surprisingly

to interpret this finding.

low percentage of case closings due

One way

is

the obvious: Welfare

reform has not improved the percentage of people leaving welfare for paid emplo> ment.
is exactly as the DTA suggests the low percentage leaving
eamings could reflect the success of increasing the earnings disregard. That is, people are
staying on the rolls longer than before welfare reform because they are eligible longer
when employed. Both explanations are plausible. But in both cases, the finding points to
problems in welfare reform in Massachusetts Clearly, if the small percentage of case closings
(no more than 20%) due to increased eamings is because people are leaving welfare without
finding jobs, then one important goal of welfare reform is a failure. If the lack of change in
closings due to increased eamings is the resuh of families staying on longer because recipients
can now mix eamings and TAFDC more effectively than prior to reform, this is very good news.

Alternatively, and perhaps correctly,
for

but

it

who

will

be very short lived because of the

are indeed in jobs,

strict

time limit for non-exempt recipients. Those

combining earnings and welfare, only have 24 months out of 60

to

TAPDC and then they are cut off completely. After December 1, 1998 — when time
limits take effect — we can expect to see the number of case closings due to earnings fall only to

receive

replaced by case closings due to exhausting the time limits.

Which one of the two

scenarios

is

likely taking place?

No one knows

independent research done on those leaving the welfare

rolls.

for sure until there

is

some

However, research on employment

records of those leaving the rolls in other states with similar provisions to Massachusetts, as
the

McCormack Institute's policy

brief points out,

is

not very encouraging.

WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW AND WHO CAN TELL US
The McCormack researchers and

And
due

in

many ways,

this study raises

to procedural sanctions so

DTA both argue that the data on case closings are

the

more questions than

high? Are they higher

long are sanctioned families without income?

Why

it

now

isn't

answers.

limited.

Why are the case closings
How

than before welfare reform?

the percentage leaving welfare

due

to

earnings higher after welfare reform than before?

This policy brief points to the importance of independent research in evaluating the effects of
welfare reform.

To

date,

much of the

"formal" information about those leaving welfare in

Massachusetts has been provided by the Department of Transitional Assistance, often through

DTA claims that a substantial proportion of cases (about
1/2) are closed because of earnings which the DTA argues that this suggests welfare reform is

press releases. In those releases, the

However, the data as analyzed here by independent researchers, suggests a very
different picture of the efficacy of Massachusetts welfare reform. The differences between the
two analysis are not merely the result of a methodological squabble. The differences point to
problems inherent in allowing the very agency which in part helped write and entirely
administers a program to then evaluate the "success" of that program. It is hard to think of a way
that DTA, or any department of the administration, could objectively evaluate welfare reform and
as such should not be asked or trusted to do so. That is not to say the DTA should not be
involved in the evaluation process. Clearly they have a vital role in providing input in and access
"working."

to data collection,

comment on

and just as the McCormack researchers have done, the

evaluations of Massachusetts welfare reform.

DTA should read and

Law Reform

Massachusetts
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The FoUcy

Brief by the

McCormack

Institute is the first

and only academically

rigorous and independent examination of any data relating to welfare reform in

Massachusetts.

As

such,

a most

it is

welcome

first

step towards analyzing welfare reform

in the state.

Unfortunately, the case closing data which the Policy Brief analyzes only allow
conclusions about differences in the distribution of case closing codes before and after

Much more

welfare reform.

research

is

needed to

assess the impact of welfare reform

on

Massachusetts famiUes.
Five issues raised by the Pohcy Brief merit further comment.

First, the PoUcy
on welfare reform impacts, but DTA
of welfare reform impacts and is no longer even making the
the public. Second, the strikingly high and increasing

Brief highlights the lack of research in Massachusetts
is

not conducting any studies

case closing data available to

percentage of procedural closings suggests that welfare reform
Third,

it is

is

not working as intended

important to be clear that the PoUcy Brief does not support a conclusion that

the caseload decline

is

attributable to welfare reform or

absence of welfare reform.

would not have occurred

in the

Fourth, the fact that there has been no increase in the

percentage of cases that are closing because of earnings raises questions about whether
welfare reform

is

achieving

its

intended goals.

And

comments on the impact of improved treatment of

finally, as

highlighted by

DTA's

earnings, time limits will force families

low earnings levels which currently qualify them for welfare supplements.
discuss each of these issues below.

off welfare at

We
1.

The

limitations of the Policy Brief highlight the need for

DTA
At

is

no longer making even the case closing data publicly

research: however,

available.

the time the legislature enacted the state's welfare reform plan most of the

state's provisions conflicted

federal waiver.
provisions.

more

DTA

with federal law and could not be implemented without a

sought and obtained federal waivers for most of the state's

A condition of obtaining the federal waiver was that

the state contract with an

independent research entity to evaluate the impacts of the welfare reform initiatives.
October 1995, before it implemented the welfare reform provisions, DTA agreed to

In
this

condition.

DTA

However,

never issued requests for proposals for a study and no study

was ever undertaken.^

DTA

fund a proper stucfy of welfare reform impacts, but
began analyzing the case closing data, DTA stopped
providing public access to current data of the type on which the report is based. DTA no
longer provides public access to monthly data on case closings categorized by case closing
code, and no longer provides public access to monthly data on sanctions that do not result
in closings, categorized by type of sanction. Thus, even a limited analysis of the type
undertaken by the McCormack Institute is no loiter possible. DTA's refusal to provide
these data, which were routinely collected and made pubhcly available before and after
welfare reform, and which were provided until McCormack began work on the PoUcy
Brief, raises serious questions about DTA's motives in preventing pubUc scrutiny.

Not only has

after the

McCormack

The most

2.

The

failed to

Institute

striking finding in the Policy Brief is the increase in procedural closings.

Policy Brief correctly states that the most striking finding is that

recipients lose benefits for procedural reasons than for

any other reason.

percentage of cases closed for procedural reasons increased from
first

and second years

after welfare

reform was implemented

30%

It is

to

more

Indeed, the

36% between

the

unfortunate that the

data compiled in the Policy Brief do not allow a comparison of procedural closings

percentages before and after welfare reform.

Procedural closings, as explained in the Appendix, include failure to

Report form,
verification.

failure to schedule

an

eligibihty review,

and

file

a Monthly

failure to supply required

Procedural closings are different from sanctions for non-compliance with

work requirements and teen parent requirements; these
dropped shghtly, from 6.0% to 5.6% between the first and

behavioral requirements, such as

behavioral sanctions actually

second years of welfare reform.

For the most

part, procedural closing reasons pre-date

welfare reform, whereas the behavioral sanction reasons were adopted as part of the state's
welfare reform plan.^

In the FY 98 budget, signed into law on July 10, 1998, the legislature created a
commission to hire a professional entity to conduct a study of welfare reform impacts and
appropriated $100,000 for that purpose. The commission has decided to rely on state employees
to conduct the study. As proposed, the study will rely solely on matching existing data sources,
such 2is Department of Revenue quarterly wage records and welfare records. This may produce
useful and important information but cannot provide information about most welfare reform
'

impacts.

—

—

^
Before welfare reform, the caretaker ^but not the entire family could be sanctioned for
non-compliance with a behavioral requirement. The state's welfare reform statute and the
federal waivers to implement it authorized full-family sanctions for noncompliance with work
requirements and teen parent requirements. Therefore, all of the behavioral sanctions closings

2

Both procedural closings and behavioral sanctions punish families with the most
severe barriers to employment. For example, in a recent study of Delaware's welfare
reform program, famiUes most likely to have barriers to self-support, namely those with the
least education and work e:^erience, were most likely to have been subject to sanctions,^

Why

have procedural closings increased dramatically after welfare reform's
The Policy Brief suggests one answen the consolidation of local welfare

implementation?

An

offices is creating access barriers for clients.

and sometimes

conflicting

demands imposed on

For example,

increasingly difficult for recipients to comply.

in-person reviews of

some welfare

recipients

additional explanation

welfare recipients that

who

DTA

is

is

the increased

make

it

conducting monthly

are subject to the time limit.

Workers

are instructed to send an appointment letter, without any consideration of whether the

appointment time

community

conflicts with previously

scheduled

—and without regard

service activities

recipient fails to

activities

—

^including required

to transportation difficulties.

keep the appointment, the worker

is

work or

K the

supposed to close the case using

Action Reason 41, one of the procedural closings. To give an idea of what welfare
recipients experience, imagine you had to meet with an Internal Revenue Service agent
once a montii, at a time arbitrarily scheduled by the agent that interfered with your work
schedule. Further imagine that you do not have access to a telephone during the day to
reschedule the appointment and that you cannot get through on the telephone

do manage

get to the appointment.

It is

when you

imagine that you do not have transportation to
not surprising that under comparable circumstances, many

to get to a telephone.

Finally,

recipients lose eligibility for procedural reasons.

represent an increase over pre-welfare reform closings. Although these closings constitute a

A number of studies

fairly

small percentage of total closings, they are nevertheless disturbing.

show

that full-family sanctions are not helpful in improving compliance with requirements.

Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work
JOBS) (Oct. 1997); Fein and Karwelt, The ABC Evaluation: The Early

Strategies (formerly

Economic Impacts of Delaware's A Better Chance Welfare Reform Program (Abt Associates,
December 1997). In Utah, 50% of sanctions were determined to be erroneous. Bill Biggs, Utah
Sanctions Revisited, CLASP Update (Nov. 1997). A recent GAO report concludes that in Iowa,
agency reviewers foimd that in 50% of the czises referred for benefit termination adequate
casework had not been done to determine whether the recipients knew about the proposed
termination and whether barriers to employment had been sufficientiy addressed. Welfare
Reform: States' Early Experiences with Benefit Termination (GAO, May 1997).
state

Fein and Karwelt, The ABC Evaluation: The Early Economic Impacts of Delaware's A
Chance Welfare Reform Program (Abt Associates, December 1997). Similarly, sanctioned
families in Minnesota were four times 2& likely to report chemical dependency, twice as likely to
report a mental health problem, twice as likely to report family violence and three times as likely
to report a family health problem. Pavetti, Olson, Nightingale, Duke, Isaacs, Welfare-to-Work
Options for Families Facing Personal and Family Challenges: Rationale and Program Strategies
(Urban Institute, Aug. 1997).
^

Better

3

3.

The

Policy Brief should not be misread as finding that the caseload decline

is

attributable to welfare reform.

There has been a great deal of academic and public discussion about the extent to
which declines in caseload, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, are attributable to welfare
reform as opposed to improvements in the economy or other causes. The draft Policy
Brief says that during the pre-welfare reform period (Oct 1993-Sept. 1995), 4.6% of
AFDC families left the welfare rolls each month as compared with 5.1% during the post-

The

welfare reform period (Oct. 1995-Aug. 1997).

Policy Brief does not say,

and should
month is

not be read as saying, that the increase in the percentage of cases closing each
attributable to welfare reform.''

It is also important to keep in mind that to some extent the results are dependent
on how the time periods are constructed For example, the results summarized in the text
do not include the interesting fact that, according to the data presented in Figure 1, the
percentage of the caseload that left the rolls during the year before welfare reform (Oct
1994-Sept 1995) was sUghtly higher than the percentage of the caseload that left the rolls

during

tiie first

year after welfare reform (Oct. 1995-Sept. 1996). Thus, during the year
AFDC famihes left the welfare rolls each month, as

before welfare reform, 5.0% of

compared with 4.9%
caseload during the

for the

first

first

year after welfare reform.

year after welfare reform

The continued

decline in the

attributable to a decline in the

is

new case openings, from 3.7% during the year before welfare reform to
3.9% during the first year after welfare reform. While for the post-reform period as a
whole (Oct. 1995-Aug. 1997), case closings increased as a percentage of the caseload as
compared with the two years preceding welfare reform, the fact that the percentage
percentage of

decreased during the first year after welfare reform serves as an additional reminder that
aggregate case closing numbers or percentages tell us very httle about the causes of
caseload decline.
4.

The

fact that the percentage of case closings

due

raises questions about viiiether welfare reform

is

to earnings

achieving

has not increased

its

intended goals.

19% of the cases
DTA, using questionable

Using DTA's case closing data, the Pohcy Brief concludes that
closed for earnings during the second year after welfare reform.

methodology, recategorized procedural and other case closings as closings with earnings,
and claims that a total of 50% of closings have earnings at the time of closure. Although

DTA's methodology

is

questionable,

DTA

is

no doubt

correct that

its

closing codes

do not

* On the other hand, it is worth noting that the behavioral case closings, which would not
have occurred before welfare reform, could account for much of the increase in the percentage
of families leaving assistance. Because many of these cases reopen, it is not possible to
determine the extent to which these cases contribute to the decline in the caseload.

4

accurately reflect

all

of the cases that close that have earnings.^

have earnings that do not make them ineUgjble for
reason unrelated to earnings.

Many

In addition,

some

but lose

cases, families

a
of these families are eligible for and would continue

to receive a small welfare supplement

threat of time limits.

assistance,

In

were

some

it

eligibility for

not for sanctions, procedural barriers and the

families have earnings that

make them

ineUgible

for assistance, but the case closes for another reason.

The

and

DTA

has not questioned, that the percentage of cases
that close because of earnings has remained essentially stable over time. The fact that,
despite the good economy, the percentage of cases that close because of earnings has not
increased is disturbing. First, it suggests that the benefits firom the improved economy are
being offset by a high rate of sanctions and procedural closings, the only categoiy of
closings which has increased. Second, it suggests that welfare recipients are in no better
position than they were before welfare reform to support their families through earned
income despite DTA's well-publicized campaign to move welfare recipients into jobs as
soon as possible.
Policy Brief finds,

Finally,

DTA

has not provided any data or

made any

claims that families that leave

welfare are better able to stay off welfare than they were in the past

Pre-welfare reform

who leave welfare with earnings
Massachusetts has not b^un to address the reasons
families need to return to welfare: low wages, job instability, lack of child care, and job

studies

need

showed

that about one-half to two-thirds of those

to return at a later point.^

inflexibility that interferes

poor families

with family responsibilities.

will continue to

need welfare even

if

Until these issues are addressed,

they are barred from receiving

it

by

time limits or procedural barriers.

DTA's suggestion

5.

that the decline in the percentage of cases closed for earnings

—

the result of higher income disr^ards

^

^niiile

not confirmed by data

—

is

highlights the

A number of studies before welfare reform determined that between one-half and two-

thirds of all welfare case closings are related to earnings.

See, for example,

Weeks, Leaving

Public Assistance in Washington State (Washington State Institute for Public Policy,

March

1991);

and Multiple Program Participation Among
Young Women (The Hoover Institution, January 1992); Pavetti, The Dynamics of Welfare and
Work: Exploring the Process by Which Young Women Work their Way off Welfare (John P. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, May 1993); Harris, "Life After Welfare: Women,
Work, and Repeat Dependency" (American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, 1997). Thus, DTA's
claims that 50% cases closings have earnings, if correct, do not show any increase over national
pre-welfare reform studies.
Gritz and

MaCurdy,

Patterns of Welfare Utilization

Blank and Ruggles, "Short-Term Recidivism among Public Assistance Recipients,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 84(2) (May 1994); Pavetti, The Dynamics of Welfare and WorkExploring the Process by Which Young Women Work their Way off Welfare (John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, May 1993).
*
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fact that time limits

The

force families off welfare at low earnings levels.

Policy Brief concludes that the percentage of cases closed

earnings decreased

20%

vpill

going from

slightly,

in the first post-welfare

certainly true that

is

to increased

two pre-welfare reform periods to
second post-welfare reform
improved
treatment of earnings
of

in the first

reform period and

period DTA suggests that the decline
which was part of welfare reform.
It is

22%

due

19%

the result

in the

improved treatment of earnings allows some recipients to

continue to receive assistance at earnings levels which would have previously
inehgible.

However, Massachusetts' treatment of earnings

is

made them

far less generous than

some

other states' treatment of earnings under welfare reform. In particular, Massachusetts has
retained (and for some recipients even lowered) gross income ehgibiUty limits which render

a family ineligible even

if it

deductions from earnings.

would otherwise

Thus, a family of

qualify for benefits after taking into account
tiiree

which

is

subject to the time limit

is

would still be ehgjble for a
small supplemental grant after taking into account deductions from earnings. For
comparison, Illinois increased its gross income eUgibility limit to the poverty level even
tou^ Illinois is a lower cost state.^ In addition, Massachusetts' income disregards are
inehgible once

its

gross income exceeds $l,045/month even

substantially less generous than

many

other

states.'

if it

Massachusetts disregards $120 and

one-half of the remainder for families subject to the time limit and $120 and one-third of
the remainder for famihes not subject to
two-thirds of income for

all

tihe

time

limit.

Illinois,

for example, disregards

famihes.

The percentage of the Massachusetts caseload that has earnings has increased
significantly, from 7.8% in state FY 95 (according to the DTA FY 1998 Spending Plan)
14.4%
still

currently.

lower than in

example, in

Despite

many

Illinois,

less favorable

this increase, the

percentage of the caseload that has earnings

other states that have improved treatment of earnings.

26%

of famihes receiving assistance have earnings.

to
is

For

In addition to the

treatment of earnings in Massachusetts as compared with

Illinois,

the

between the Massachusetts and Illinois percentages of the caseload with
also be partially attributable to a more easily understandable system and to
more successful efforts in Illinois to explain it. In Massachusetts, welfare workers have had
to e3q)lain the comphcated income disregard rules as only one of the myriad welfare
reform changes. Confusion is widespread regarding how earnings are treated, but if
famihes do not understand the income disregards then the disregards cannot operate as a
differences

earnings

work

may

incentive.

In order to determine whether improved treatment of earnings

is

having an impact

on the rate of case closings for earnings, additional information is needed about the
amounts of the famihes' earnings. This information should enable a researcher to

'

John Bouman, Poverty Law

Project, Chicago, Illinois (telephone call, April 24, 1998).
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determine whether or not a significant percentage of the cases with earnings would be
ineligible were it not for the improved treatment of earnings. However, it is worth noting
that Illinois, despite

its

much more

higher percentage of the caseload with earnings, has

experienced no decline in the percentage of famihes that are working their

way

off welfare.

any reduction in case closings because families are able to continue to
receive assistance at earnings levels which previously would have made them ineligible is
apparently being offiset by the fact that more famihes are doing paid work and achieving
earning enough to exceed the increased eligibiUty levels. Improved treatment of earnings,
if properly implemented, need not result in a reduction in closings due to earnings.

Thus, in

Illinois,

Finally,

although the percentage of Massachusetts' recipients with earnings

is

less

than in other states that have improved treatment of earnings, the increase fi^om 7.8% to

14.4%

is

nevertheless a significant

and

positive change.

Unfortunately, under the state's

two-year time limit, even those families yvho are employed will lose

year point

Thus, the time limit policy will cut

ofif

those families

all benefits at

the two-

who have responded

to

improved treatment of earnings as the law intended, and v/ho have received only partial
benefits because of their employment We can expect the percentage of the caseload with
earnings to drop once time limits hit, as families are forced off welfare despite low
earnings.
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APPENDK: LISTING OF CLUSTERED CATEGORIES

MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: CXTTOBER 1993-AUGUST

1997

May

15.

1998

Ousters and Their Actions Codes

CLUSTER NUMBER
Cluster

I:

ACTION CODE NUMBER AND REASON

Increased Income

N=23,056 (24%)
a.

b.

Earned income

N= 18,596

(19%)

Income from another £unily member

Code
Code

61:

Case closed due to loss of S30 and/or
Case closed due to earnings.

Code

92:

Case closed, counting income of minor parents or minor

60:

1/3 disregard.

parent
c.

Q.

Excess assets

uncsTiicu mcoiiic

Code
Code

31: Case closed due to assets in excess of program limits.
72:

Case closed,

client received

lump sum income.

K^oue zj. \.^sk or nousenoiQ meuioer cioscu aue lo reccipi oi oox.

Code

30: Case closed due to unearned

program

Code

income in excess of

limits.

member closed due to

33: Case or household

eligibility for,

or receipt

of,

another benefit.

Cluster H: Sanctions N=36,775 (39%)
a.

Non-compliance with behavioral

requirement

N=5,560 (6%)

Code

34: Case or household

member closed,

client refuses to

apply for other potential benefit or resource.

Code

73:

Case or household closed,

failed to participate in

ESP

mos disqualification).
Case or household member closed, teen parent

without good cause (1st time

-

3

in home
Code 79:
no longer meeting the requirement that a teen parent or a pregnant teen
must either have a high school diploma or be attending school or a

GED program.
Code

member closed, client foiled to
ESP without good cause (second time).
Case or household member closed, failure to meet

81: Case or household

participate in

Code

87:

roquircmciii uuii a iccu poicoi musi iivc wiui aii ouiui
relative, legal

guardian or in an available teen structured

program.

Code

95:

Case or household member closed,

failure to

meet school

attendance (Leamfare) requirements.
b.

Non-compliance with procedural

requirement

N=31,215 (33%)

Code

28:

Case closed, household member

failed to

cooperate without good cause in the disability

determination process to decide

if you

meet the (T)AF£>C

deprivation factor for incapacity.

Code

39:

Case closed, did not provide income and/or asset

verification.

Code

40: Case or household

member closed,

did not provide

required verification(s).

Code

41: Case closed due to failure to keep

appointment or to return

Code

42:

Case closed,

eligibility

an

eligibility

review

review form.

client refuses to con:q)ly

with

lien/assignment provisions.

Code
Code

58: Case closed, did not cooperate with Quality Control.

Code

64:

59: Case closed due
Mnnthlv Rennrt

to failure to correct

Case or household member closed,

an incomplete

client did not verify

SSN or application for SSN.
Code

67:

Report

Case closed,

failure to return

a complete Monthly

b.

Non-compliance with procedural

requirement con't.

Code 71: Case closed due to &ilure to correct an inadequate
Monthly Report.
i-AKie / H \.,asc or uouscuoiu mcuiDcr ciosco, lauuic lo ooc^jcihic
.

with direct deposit requirements.

Code

86: Case closed, failure to schedule an
end of disqualification period.

Cluster m: Eligible Persons

Moved

Code

43: Household

member closed,

eligibility

review at

child in temporary custody

of DSS or other agency and grantee no longer exercises care and control

N=8,013 (8%)

member dosed, an eligible household
member is no longer in the home (adult member).
Code 47: Case or household member closed, an eUgible dependent
over child. Case or household

child(ren) is

Code

no longer in the home.

48: Case or household

member closed, no longer a

Massachusetts resident

Code 50: Case or household member closed, whereabouts
unknown - no mail returned (10 notice required).
Code 54: Case or household member closed, whereabouts
unknown - mail returned. (No 10 days notice required).
Cluster IV: Fraud

N=428 (0.5%)

Code

77:

Case closed due to a bank match that revealed

imreported assets in excess of program limits.

Code 83: Case closed, case

identified as receiving assistance in

another state (result of interstate match).

Code 89: C^ase or household member disqualified for Intentional
Program Violation (Central OfiQce Recoiq)ment Unit use
only).

Clustery: Client Request
IN— 14,JOO (IJ/o)

Code

98: Case denied;

result

of fiont end detectioiL

BSI determines applicant

Code 38: Case or household meniber closed

fraudulent;

at the written request

oi ciieni lo lermuiaie aii caiegoncai uenenis ^casn, looa

stamps,

Code

MA and Medicare payments).

76:

Case closed, written request of client

to slop

cash

benefits only.

No Longer Eligible
N=2,030 (2%)

Cluster VI:

Code

35: Case is closed, dependent child has both parents living

home and no deprivation factor.
Code 36: Case closed, feilure to meet program

in the

ineligible for

rules of eligibility;

TAFDC for reason other than not

work history requirement
Code 37: Case closed, disability eiqtecied
days. Case or household

member closed,

meeting

60
no longer has health

to last fewer than

client

problem keeping him or her from working, or caring for a child.
Code 44: Case or household member closed, a household member
does not meet the citizenship or noncitizen status rules for the program
Code 62: Case or dependent child(ren) age 18 or 19 closed,
child(ren) does not meet age and/or school attendance
requirements.

Code

63: Case or household

MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993.AUGUST 1997

member closed. No longer pregnant

May

IS.

1998

Cluster Vn: Other or Multiple Meanings

Code

N=

included in another assistance unit

10,986 (12%)

23:

(i)

Case closed, required by the (T)AFDC rules to be
(ii) Case closed due to

income or assets of the person receiving care in excess of
I»ogram limits.
Code 24: (i) Case closed, due to suiqwrt p^ments in excess of
program limits, (ii) Case dosed, eligible for
unenq>loyment compensation.

Code

26:

(i)

Case closed, failed to appear for scheduled transition
(ii) Case closed, counting income and assets of

eligibility review,

parents or qxNise.

Code

Case closed, dependent no longer meets age rules or
is valid in any month of the 12-month
extension, (ii) Case closed, due to an asset transfer.
Code 45: (i) Case closed, became a resident of a public or private
institution, (ii) Case closed. Disability Review Unit
determined that you and/or a household member do not meet the
is

32:

(i)

out of home. Use of this code

disability requirements of the

meet the

Code

program,

disability requirement

46:

(i)

(iii)

Case closed, you do not

of the program.

PAFS closed - required to get Food Stamps (FS) in

FS

case, (ii) Case or household member closed,
been living in a mental health institution for
more than 60 days, (iii) Case closed, household member will begin

another

client has

receiving

FS

Code
Code

(i)

in another

FS case.

49: Case closed due to death.

51:

Case closed, &ilure to conq>lete a fiunily cap
(ii) Case closed, failure to meet

eligibility review,

program

rules for eligibility, ineligibility for

AFDC for

reason other than not meeting relationship.

Code

Case closed due to striker, (ii) Case closed, no longer
M.C.
Code 55: (i) Case closed due to earnings. Case eligible for RRP
extended medical benefits, (ii) Case closed, you and/or a
household member are not enrolled in school or a GED
program and do not meet the teen living arrangement
53:

(i)

participating in

requirements of living with a parent, another responsible
adult relative or in a teen structured living program,

(iii)

household member does not meet this program's rules for
student because he or she

is

Case closed,
eligibility as

not regularly attending high school

a

fiill-

time.

Co<k 57: (i) Case closed, the Disability Review Unit has
determined that you and/or a household member do not have a physical
and/or mental impairment that affects your ability to woik. (ii) Case
closed, your recent Medical Report states that you do not have a
physical and/or mental inq)airment that affects your ability to

work,

(iii)

Case or household member closed,

client is

a

boarder, or a resident of a commercial boarding house, or

Uving in a half-way house not licensed by the state, (iv) Case dosed,
caretaker relative had no earnings in one or more months of the
quarteriy reporting period.

Code

65:

(i)

(T)AFDC unit closed due to a combination of

earnings and siq)port payments in excess of program limits,

household member closed, client

member dosed,

client did not

MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: CXTTOBER 1993-AUGUST

1997

is

in jail,

(iii)

(ii)

Case or

Clase or household

meet FS woik registration requirements.

M«y

15.

1998

Cluster
con't

Vn: Other or Multiple Meanings

Code

66:

(i)

Grantee closed due to

Child Support Enforcement Unit,

cooperate with the
Case denied, your Medical Report

fiailure to

(ii)

was not con4>leted within 30 days of its being filed within the
Department
Code 88: (i) Grantees closed, £ulure to meet immunization
Requirements, (ii) Case closed, your most recent Medical
Report was based on an examination done over 30 days
before the Medical Rqwrt was completed.
Code 90: (i) Case closed due to counting the income or assets of
dependent children and their parents, (ii) Optional Assistance unit
closed.

Code

91: Disqualification period over (Central Office

Recoupment Unit

use only).

Code

Case or household members closed because of
Case closed, your
Medical Report was not con:q}leted within 30
of its being filed
94:

(i)

institutionalization, including incarceration, (ii)

d^

with the Dq)artmenL

Code 96: (i) Food Stamp portion of SSI case closed, (ii)
Household member closed. (Used only when 1 or more
household members have left the home or when no other
action reason is appropriate.)

(iii)

Case or household

member closed, while a fleeing felon, (iv) Case or
household member closed due to being a drug felon,
Case or household member closed due to multiple

(v)

cash/food stamp benefit/plication, (vi) Grantee, legally

member closed due to a reason other
TAFE>C program sanction.
Code 97: (i) Case or household member closed, client failed to
participate in ESP without good cause (third and subsequent time), (ii)
Case closed, you and/or a household member £ailed to provide a
completed disability supplement (iii) Case or household member
liable for

siq^rt, or household

than intentional program violation or

closed, failure to

comply with the Food Stamp Employment and

Training Program requirements without good cause (3rd time

-

12

mos

disqualification).

Code

99:

Change due to the replacement of existing facsimile or
number by a new or corrected social security number.

Social security

MASSACHUSETTS (T)AFDC CASE CLOSINGS: OCTOBER 1993-AUGUST
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13,

1998
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